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NOTES
Judicial v. Legislative Power
in Kentucky: A "Comity" of Errors
Comity/k6mediy/. Courtesy; complaisance; respect; a willingness

to granta privilege, not as a matterof right but out of deference
and good will.'
INTRODUCTION

Struggles over separation of powers have recently become
prominent in Kentucky, especially as between the Governor and
the General Assembly. 2 A more subtle but equally important

struggle, however, has developed between the General Assembly
and the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
In November 1975, Kentuckians adopted a new Judicial Article, amending Kentucky's Constitution and dramatically increas-

ing the power of Kentucky's judicial department.3 The new Judicial Article brought about many changes in Kentucky's judicial
branch, including a unified court system 4 headed by the Chief

Justice of the newly-created Kentucky Supreme Court' and an
express grant of rulemaking power to that Court.6

Because Kentucky's high court now possesses express power
to make rules and to control the "Court of Justice," 7 in addition
I BLACK'S

LAW DICnONARY 242 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
2 See Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1982). Barkley concerns the Governor's power to reorganize certain state administrative agencies without legislative sanction. See also Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, No. 82-CI-0780 (Franklin Cir. Ct.
filed June 14, 1982).
3 See KY. CONST. § 109 compiler's notes (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982).
4 See id.
5 Id. § 110(5)(b).
6 See id. § 116; see also id. § 115 (limited rulemaking power granted with regard
to "expeditious and inexpensive appeals"). Section 116 provides:
The Supreme Court shall have power to prescribe rules governing its appellate jurisdiction, rules for the appointment of commissioners and other
court personnel, and rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice.
The Supreme Court shall, by rule, govern admission to the bar and the
discipline of members of the bar.
7 The "Court of Justiee" is the term used in the new Judicial Article for all levels
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to the broad inherent power it previously claimed,8 conflicts
have arisen between legislative enactments and court rules or courtannounced policy. This Note focuses on the Supreme Court's unsuccessful' attempts to resolve these conflicts under the name of
"comity," and suggests an analytical approach that embraces a
true spirit of comity.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMITY

Kentucky's former high court, the Court of Appeals, exercised
rulemaking power prior to the adoption of the new Judicial Article in 1975. The General Assembly long ago delegated rulemaking authority to the Court over various matters, including admission to and ethics of the bar 0 and civil practice and procedure."
In addition, the Court has long claimed inherent power over matters of judicial administration and procedure.12 The source of this
inherent power, according to the Court, is "the act of division of
powers among the three branches of government ...

and the

grant of judicial power to the courts by the constitution.' 3 Thus,
the reasons for use of the principle of comity are not new to Kentucky courts. In fact, recognition of separation of powers concerns
is obvious in many of the early inherent judicial power cases, even
though the decisions in many of these cases followed a judicial
policy or rule contrary to statutes.
A.

Early Developments Prior to the 1975 JudicialArticle

In the 1938 case of Burton v. Mayer,'4 the Court of Appeals
refused to follow section 760 of the Civil Code of Practice, 15
of courts in the state, including the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, circuit courts and
district courts. See id. § 109.
8 Kentucky's former Court of Appeals long ago claimed a broad inherent power over
matters of judicial administration and procedure. See, e.g., Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d
547, 549 (Ky. 1938). See text accompanying note 14 infra for a discussion of this case.
9 The cases that have used the term "comity" include: O'Bryan v. Commonwealth,
634 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1982); Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky.
1980); Ex parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1978).
10 See Act of 1934, ch. 3, 1934 Ky. Acts 5 (repealed 1976).
11 See Act of Feb. 25, 1952, ch. 18, 1952 Ky. Acts 29 (repealed 1976).
12 See note 8 supra.
13 Craft v. Commonwealth, 343 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Ky. 1961).
14 118 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1938).
15 Code of Practice in Civil Cases § 760 (Carroll's Code 1938) (repealed 1966).
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which prohibited the Court from issuing a mandate until thirty
days after the date upon which its decision was rendered.16 In
Burton, the trial court had enjoined as unconstitutional the enforcement of legislation which, to have any effect, had to go into
operation immediately. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court as to the legislation's constitutionality but because of section 760's thirty-day waiting period it was barred from mandating
17
a lift of the lower court injunction.
The Court decided to issue the mandate in spite of section 760,
applying the following reasoning:
So long as the rules of practice fixed by the legislature accord
with the proper and effective administration of justice, they
should be, and they are, followed to the letter ....
Where,
however, a situation arises in which the administration is impairedor the general rules of practice are unworkable, the duty
undoubtedly rests on the courts to draw upon the reserve of their
inherent power ... to carry out the purposes of the
Constitution. 8

In Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Furstel9 and
Craft v. Commonwealth,20 the Court reaffirmed the impairment
test announced in Burton. It applied a similar version of this test
in the landmark case of Arnett v. Meade.21 In Arnett, the Court
of Appeals found unconstitutional certain statutory limitations
placed on the judicial contempt power. The Court said judicial
contempt is a matter over which it has inherent control. Consequently, the Court struck Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 421.140, 2 which limited the punishment of contempt for a
witness's refusal to testify. According to the Court, the statute's
limitations on its power to punish contempt were unreasonable

16 Id.
17 118 S.W.2d at 548. The trial court could not lift its own injunction because, until the Court of Appeals had issued its mandate, the case was deemed to be pending in
the Court of Appeals. Id. at 549.
18 Id. (emphasis added).
1 157 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1941).
20 343 S.W.2d at 150.
21 462 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1971).
2 Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.140 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) (amended 1976, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as KRS].
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and would "materially interfere with the administration of
justice."23

Whether the test for application of the Court's inherent powers
is called "interference" or "impairment,"24 the Court of Appeals
consistently assumed prior to the adoption of the 1975 Judicial
Amendment that reasonable legislative regulations over such functions as judicial administration and court procedure were permissible. It refused to follow the legislature's acts only when those regulations became so restrictive as to "defeat or materially impair
the [Court's] exercise of those functions." 5 Significantly, in the
foregoing cases the Court never asserted its inherent power over
administrative or procedural matters to the exclusion of legislative
control.2 The Court's "interference" test merely served to limit
the legislature's exercise of concurrent authority over such matters.
B.

Current Developments and Confusion

The Court first announced its reliance on the principle of comity for permitting legislative action on judicial matters in Ex parte
Farley.27 In Farley as in Arnett, the Supreme Court considered
the validity of a statute which purported to control a judicial administration of matter over which the Court had traditionally
claimed inherent power.
Farley was a declaratory judgment action brought by Jack
Emory Farley, a Public Advocate, against the justices of the
Supreme Court, both individually and collectively. Farley argued
that he had a right under Kentucky's Open Records Law2s to see
the materials accumulated by certain staff attorneys working with
the Administrative Office of the Courts9 pursuant to a statute
23 462 S.W.2d at 948.
2 The "interference" test was first spelled out in Arnett. Id. at 948. It is, however,

merely a rendition of the "impairment" test applied in earlier inherent judicial power cases.
See, e.g., Burton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d at 549.
25 462 S.W.2d at 946.
2 See id. ("the legislature may put reasonablerestrictions upon constitutional functions of the courts").
27 570 S.W.2d at 617. The Kentucky Supreme Court agreed to hear the case on
transfer directly from the Franklin Circuit Court. Id. at 618-19.
28 KRS § 61.870-.884 (1980) (effective July 1, 1976).
2 The Administrative Office of the Courts is the administrative arm of the Court
of Justice and is of particular importance to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. See
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requiring those attorneys to prepare various materials relevant to
30
the Supreme Court's review of a death penalty sentence.
The Court held that its records, including the materials being prepared by the attorneys, were within its inherent power like
all court records and thus could not be regulated by statute, at
least when such regulation interfered "with the orderly conduct
of [the Court's] . . .business."'31 But in dictum the Court added:
Where statutes do not interfere or threaten to interfere with the
orderly administration of justice, what boots it to quibble over
which branch of government has rightful authority? We respect
the legislative branch, and in the name of comity and common
sense are glad to accept without cavil the 2application of its
statutes pertaining to judicial matters .... 3
The above quotation appears to subscribe to the Arnett "interference" test. However, in Farleythe Court does not cite Arnett
or any of the earlier inherent power cases. Furthermore, parts of
the opinion suggest that the Court considers its power over matters which are "inseparable from the judicial function" to be exclusive of legislative action concerning the same matters.33 This
carving out of an area of exclusive authority departs from the rationale of the earlier inherent power cases in which the Court of
Appeals readily recognized concurrentauthority in the legislature
over such matters, albeit a limited authority in case the legislature
should impair the Court's administration of justice.4
In Ex parteAuditor of Public Accounts,35 the Supreme Court
further discussed the comity principle announced in Farley.
Auditor did not link the "interference" test applied in Arnett with
the principle of comity announced in Farley. However, it did limit
comity to matters considered to be within the Court's inherent
powers and to other matters not expressly granted to the Supreme

KRS § 27A.050 (1980); see also KY. Sup. CT.R. 1.050.
30 See KRS § 532.075(6)-(7) (Supp. 1982).
31 570 S.W.2d at 625.

32 Id. at 624.
33 Id. ("[Riecords generated by the courts in the course of their work are inseparable
from the judicial function itself, and are not subject to statutory regulation"). Id.
34 See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
35 609 S.W.2d at 682.
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Court in the Constitution, 36 a limitation predicted in the Farley
intimation of an area of exclusive Court authority.
Auditor was an action brought directly in the Kentucky
Supreme Court by State Auditor James K. Graham. Graham asked
the Court to determine whether he must or could under state law
37
audit the books and accounts of the Kentucky Bar Association.
The Court not only refused to permit the audit, but voided the
last four sections of KRS chapter 21A.3 The Court's rationale
was that the new Judicial Article's express grant of rulemaking
authority over bar admission and discipline 9 "completely removed the subject [of bar admission and bar regulation] from any
legislative authority and [thus] rendered obsolete and ineffective

the statutes pertaining to

it."40

The State Auditor argued that he was statutorily authorized
to audit the Kentucky Bar Association and that the audit was permissible under the Arnett test. 41 He apparently assumed that
Farley's principle of comity was fundamentally the same as the
interference test of Arnett, and that this test applied to the Court's
exercise of powers expressly conferred by the Judicial Articleda
Thus, he argued, the audit should be allowed because the legislation requiring him to audit the association was a reasonable restriction upon the judicial branch which did not "defeat or material3
ly impair the exercise of" the Court's constitutional functions.
The Court rejected the Auditor's arguments, saying that "[t]he
correct principle, as we view it, is that the legislative function cannot be so exercised as to interfere... with the functioning of the
courts, and that any constitutional intrusion is per se unreasonable." 44 The Court refused to apply the Arnett test on the
ground that it pre-dated the adoption of the new Judicial Arti-

36 See text accompanying notes 46-49 infra.
37 609 S.W.2d at 683.
38 Id. at 684.
39 Ky. CONST. § 115.
40 609 S.W.2d at 684.

41Id. at 687.
42 The Auditor specifically argued "that the exercise of such authority [authority to
audit the Bar Association] would not interfere with judicial functions." This argument
was sound in light of the history of inherent judicial power cases. Id. at 687.
43 Id. at 688.
44 Id.
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cle. Moreover, to the extent that Arnett commented that the
legislature could restrict judicial functions, the Court said such
commentary "must be confined fundamentally to the area of
comity."

45

The apparent rule from Auditor is that the principle of comity does not apply to matters expressly granted to the authority of
the Supreme Court under section 116 of the Judicial Article. 46
Thus, although the Court declared in Auditor that the principle
of comity exists because the Court "much prefer[s] cooperation
over conflict" with the General Assembly, 47 the limits it placed
on the scope of comity leave it free to exercise exclusive control
over those matters expressly granted to its authority. While the
General Assembly and the Court may concurrently control, in "a
spirit of comity," 48 those matters falling into that "gray area...
between the legislative prerogatives of the General Assembly and
the rule-making authority of the courts," 49 the Court is free to
act unreasonably or unaccountably, with no readily effective check
on its action, ° as to those matters now viewed as within its exclusive control and outside the scope of comity.
45 Id.
46 Ky. CONST. § 116. See note 6 supra for the text of this section.
47 609 S.W.2d at 688.
48 Id.

49 Id. This reading of Auditor-thatcomity applies only to matters falling into the
"gray areas"-follows from other remarks the Court made in the opinion indicating that
it considers its expressly granted rulemaking power to be exclusive. See id. at 684 ("constitutional amendment completely removed the subject from any legislative authority")
(emphasis added). However, the Court qualified its own statement that it is per se
unreasonable for the legislature to intrude upon the express constitutional powers of the
Court with the phrase "unless it [the intrusion]... should be tolerated in a spirit of comity."
Id. at 688. This savings clause conflicts with the holding of Auditor in that if the constitutional grant of power over bar admission and regulation is exclusive, then the Court would
be acting unconstitutionally by allowing to stand, even in a spirit of comity, any legislation that impinges upon those matters over which it has rulemaking control. By definition, if the power is exclusive, no other branch can exercise it. Cf. Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143, 151 (1851) ("[i]f the Constitution excluded the States
from making any law regulating commerce, certainly [C]ongress cannot regrant, or in
any manner reconvey to the States that power").
50 Because the Court itself exercises judicial review, no judicial check is available
to oversee the propriety of any of the Court's actions. Contrast the Court's situation with
that of the other branches over which there is judicial review. See, e.g., Brown v. Barkley,
628 S.W.2d at 616. Voters are the ultimate check on the Court under the state's method
of popular election of judges. See Ky. CONST. § 117; cf. Ex parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d at
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CoMITY's LIMITATIONS AND EFFECTS

What Falls in the "Gray Area'?

Since Auditor limited the application of comity to the "gray
area" between the legislative and judicial power, the natural question is: What falls into that gray area? But the easier question might
be: What is not in the gray area? Auditor holds that since the constitution expressly grants the Court control of bar admission and
regulation, such regulation falls within the Court's exclusive rulemaking domain.51 Similar reasoning suggests that all matters
expressly granted in the new Judicial Article to the Court's control fall within the Court's exclusive domain and outside the "gray
area." However, the matters expressly granted to the Court involve many undefinable gray areas themselves.
For instance, section 116 of the constitution grants to the Court
the power to promulgate rules regarding "practice and procedure
for the Court of Justice."52 But what is "practice" or "procedure," and how does that differ from "substance"? The words
"practice" and "procedure" have long been used to delegate rulemaking authority by statute to the high court of Kentucky,-" but
no significant historical meaning has attached to them.
In O'Bryan v. Commonwealth,-5 the Supreme Court exhibited some confusion itself in delineating what is a "practice" or
"procedure." The Court indicated in dicta that the criminal change
of venue statute,5s which has never been incorporated into either
Kentucky's criminal practice code or criminal rules of court, was
capable of being "superseded by th[e] Court under the Court's
paramount rulemaking authority." 56 However, until the statute
625 ("we [the Court] are direct representatives of the public no less than is the General
Assembly... [or] the Governor"). However, this check is not readily available or effective because judicial terms of office are relatively long, see KY. CONST.§ 119 (Supreme
Court terms of office are eight years; Senate terms are only four years, id. 30), but more
importantly, because justices run only on the basis of their legal credentials and not on
the basis of issues. The latter may even be unethical. See KY. Sup. Cr. R. 4.300 Cannon

7B(1)(c).
'51
See text accompanying notes 39-40, 46-50 supra.
52 Ky. CONST. § 116.
5

See Act of Feb. 25, 1952, ch. 18, § 1, 1952 Ky. Acts 29 (repealed 1976).

54 634 S.W.2d at 153.

5 KRS § 452.220 (1982).
56 634 S.W.2d at 158.
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is superseded, the Court added, it "stands as enacted ...under
the principle of comity elucidated in" Auditor. The Court apparently viewed criminal change of venue as a "practice" or "procedure" within its exclusive control- but then confused the issue
by relying on the principle of comity which, under Auditor, should
not apply to a matter within the Court's exclusive authority.
Without prior interpretations to supply the words "procedure"
or "substance" with a definite meaning, any attempt to develop
a definition is futile. 59 Thus, one of the most important powers
expressly granted to the Kentucky Supreme Court in the new
Judicial Article-the power to make rules over practice and
procedure-remains ambiguous.60
B.

The Seeds of Unaccountability

Because Auditor limits the application of comity to only those
matters not within the Court's constitutionally granted rulemaking power, no effective check exists to curb the Court's exercise

57

1d.
58 Id. Implicit in the O'Bryan decision is the assumption that change of venue is a
matter of "procedure." In a recent case, Evans v. Commonwealth, No. 82-SC-194 DG
(Ky. Nov. 2, 1982), the Court may have recognized what it did not in O Bryan: that treating
criminal venue changes as a matter of procedure involves this implicit assumption. Id.,
slip op. at 3. This assumption, however, may be contrary to Kentucky's constitution, which
guarantees a defendant the right to trial by a jury of the "vicinage" unless the General
Assembly enacts a law changing the venue. Ky. CONST. § 11. The constitution arguably

does not allow the Court, as opposed to the legislature, to change criminal venue by rule.
Cf. Brief for Appellee at 7, Evans v. Commonwealth, No. 82-SC-194-DG (courts have
no inherent constitutional authority to transfer a criminal case on any basis other than
that provided by statute).
'9Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny, as well as innumerable examples from the conflictslchoice-of-law field, amply demonstrate the fallacy
of trying to draw a definite line between these terms. Cf. C. GRAu, JuDICIAL RULEMAKING: ADMINISTRATION, AccESS AND AccoUNTABILITY 3 (1978) ("No definitional solution has
been found to this puzzle"). To confuse matters more, what may be characterized as
substance or procedure in the context of one area of the law may be just the opposite in
another area. See Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 436 A.2d 147, 153 (Pa. 1981) (pre-judgment
interest rule of court can be "substantive" in context of federal diversity case of Bullins
v. City of Philadelphia, 516 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1981) and still be "procedural" for
purposes of validity under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rulemaking power over
procedure).
60 See C. GRAu,supra note 59, at 3.
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of power when it claims exclusive authority over a matter. 61 The

Court is thus free to exercise its power unreasonably and unaccountably.
Judicial accountability has recently become the focus of many
scholars.62 Such scholars often conclude that although the
judiciary should have primary control over procedural rulemak-

ing, legislative action should not be completely foreclosed.

One

problem with placing exclusive rulemaking authority in the court

is that the court may feel too assured that its rules are the final
word on a procedural or administrative matter. If this happens,
the court could easily become lax in its rulemaking procedures,
so that the public, the bench and bar are denied sufficient notice
and opportunity to be heard regarding proposed judicial policies
are rules. 64

A good example of this occurred on June 12, 1981, when the
Supreme Court entered an order effecting several changes in Ken-

tucky's Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr).65 In that order, the
Court altered RCr 7.266 so that it was meaningless. 67 The Court

61 See note 50 supra.
62 See, e.g., C. GRAu, supra note 59, at 49-66; J.
RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES

WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF

COURT

(1977); Ashmann, Measuringthe JudicialRule-Making Power,

59 JUDICATURE 215, 221 (1975); Grau, Who Rules the Courts?, 62 JUDICATURE 428, 430-31
(1979); Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court'sNew Rules on Lawyer Advertising: Some
Practical,Legal, and Policy Questions, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 509, 523 (1978); Parness, Public
Process and State Court Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 1319 (1979); Parness & Manthey,
PublicProcess and State JudicialRulemaking, 1 PACE L. REv. 121, 130 (1980); Wheeler,
Broadening Participation in the Courts Through Rulemaking and Administration, 62
JUDICATURE 281 (1979).
63 See, e.g., C. GRAU, supra note 59, at 14-22; see also Kaplan & Greene, The

Legislature'sRelation to Judicial Rulemaking: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury,
65 HARV. L. REV. 234, 254 (1951-52) ("doubtful wisdom for a court to place itself beyond
legislative control"); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over JudicialRulemaking:
A Problem in ConstitutionalRevision, 107 PA. L. REv. 1, 36 (1958) (legislature should
have concurrent authority with the high court over administrative and procedural matters).
64 See generally Parness & Manthey, supra note 62 (notice and opportunity to be
heard should be provided to public in rulemaking process).
65 Order Amending Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedures (RCr) 81-5, reprinted
in KENTUCKY DECISIONS 610-618 S.W.2d at XCVII (1981) [hereinafter cited as Ky. DEC.].
66 KY. R. CRIM. P. 7.26 (amended 1981) [hereinafter cited as RCr], reprintedin KY.
DEC., supra note 65, at CXVIII.
67 The rule as originally typed read as though the Commonwealth must produce its
witnesses' statements for the judge rather than for the defendant.
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then amended the rule in a "correcting" order68 that came down
about a week before the original order was to take effect.69 According to former Chief Justice Palmore, the rule was merely
mistyped in the original order and later corrected. 70 The problem, of course, is not so much that the error occurred, but that
the error went completely unnoticed until a week before the rule
was scheduled to go into effect. 71 The Court simply had not
allowed the public, the bench and bar ample notice and oppor7
tunity to comment on the proposed draft of the rule. 2
Even as corrected, RCr 7.26 presents problems that may haunt
Kentucky courts for some time to come 3 Recently, in Wright v.

68 Order Correcting Amendment of Criminal Rules (RCr) 81-5 (entered Aug. 24,
reprintedin OFFICE

OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, UNIV. OF KY. COLLEGE OF LAW,

&

SEMINAR

Ky. BAR ASS'N,

[hereinafter cited as

ON RECENT CHANGES

IN CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE

(1981)

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION].

69 In a series of three judicial seminars sponsored by the Office of Continuing Legal
Education, two University of Kentucky law professors pointed out several errors in the
original Order 81-5. In the second of the seminar series, conducted in Owensboro, Kentucky, on Friday, Aug. 21, 1981, former Chief Justice Palmore of the Kentucky Supreme
Court happened to be present. He noted the professors' concerns, and the following Monday, Aug. 24, 1981, promulgated the order correcting the original Supreme Court Order
81-5. See generally CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 68.- Order 81-5, as corrected, took effect Sept. 1, 1981.
70 He explained the situation at a seminar on the criminal rule changes in
Owensboro. See note 69 supra.
71 See note 69 supra.
72 The story of the drafting process behind the criminal rule amendments established
by Supreme Court Order 81-5 typifies the lack of sufficient public access to the Kentucky
Supreme Court's rulemaking process. The Criminal Rules Revision Committee, appointed
by the Supreme Court in May 1978, studied the criminal rules for more than two years,
making numerous proposals for change, which were submitted to the Judicial Council
in July 1980, and then forwarded to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court received
comments and held a public hearing on the rules proposed by the Criminal Rules Revision Committee on Dec. 9, 1980. Justice Robert Stephens, the present Chief Justice, was
appointed to chair a committee of the Court to consider the written and oral suggestions,
and on June 12, 1981, the Court entered its order effecting the changes in the rules. The
Court did not, however, conduct another public hearing on the changes made by the Court's
committee. Thus, the rules which were finally promulgated completely differed from the
proposed rules on which the public's comments were received and a public hearing held,
and were adopted without the benefit of any public comment.
Many scholars have condemned this lack of public process. See, e.g., C. CRAU,
supra note 59, at 49-66.
73 The rule as it currently reads, and as amended and corrected, provides that
"[b]efore a witness called by the Commonwealth testifies on direct examination the attorney for the Commonwealth shall produce any statement of the witness .... " RCr
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Commonwealth,74 the Court construed RCr 7.26, not as a slightly modified Jencks Act 75 provision, but rather as a "modest" discovery rule7 In Wright, the Court discussed the history behind
RCr 7.26 and why the rule was amended in the first place.77 The
Criminal Rules Revision Committee had proposed that Kentucky
adopt a more liberal criminal discovery. 78 The Supreme Court
rejected this proposal, but amended RCr 7.26 to allow discovery
of witness statements before instead of after a witness testifies.79
Wright construed the new language of RCr 7.26 to allow discovery
of witness statements any time before trial "within the trial court's
sound discretion."' 80
Wright clearly suggests that the Court thought the changes

it made in RCr 7.26 were a "middle ground" between the liberal
discovery rules proposed by the Criminal Rules Revision Committee and Kentucky's traditionally conservative criminal discovery
rules.8 However, the Court did not allow the public, the bench
and bar an adequate opportunity to comment on the desirability

7.26(1) (emphasis added). Does "before" a witness is called mean only before the witness
physically takes the stand after trial begins or some time before trial? This ambiguity has
created significant problems. See Plymale & McSwain, Developments in CriminalProcedure: RCr 7.26, An Open File Discovery Rule?, KY. BENCH & BAn, Jan. 1983, at 14.
74 637 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1982)
75 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). The "Jencks Act" is so called because it is a codification
of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957) (Jencks was entitled to an order
directing the government to produce reports touching on the content of prosecution
witnesses' testimony to enable Jencks to prepare his defense). Cf. Lynch v. Commonwealth,
472 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Ky. 1971) (RCr 7.26 referred to as "our counterpart to the Jencks
Act").
The original RCr 7.26 was functionally identical to 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Both provided for a court order to produce the statement of a prosecution witness after that witness
had testified and on motion of the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b); RCr 7.26(1). RCr
7.26 as amended provides that the prosecution "shall produce" witness statements before
that witness testifies. Implicitly, neither a motion by defendant nor action by court is
necessary.
76 637 S.W.2d at 636. See Plymale & McSwain, supra note 73, at 14.
77 637 S.W.2d at 636.

78 See id. The Committee substantially adopted the approach taken in UNIF. R.
CRiM. P. 421-22 (1974).
79 CompareRCr 7.26(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) with RCr 7.26(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).

80 637 S.W.2d at 636.
81 Id. (objective of amended version of RCr 7.26 was "modest indeed" when compared with liberal criminal discovery rules). See generally Plymale & McSwain, supra
note 73, at 14.
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of expanding criminal discovery or on the question of how such
an expansion should be incorporated into the rules.82
Another example of a rule adopted without the benefit of consideration by the General Assembly or the bench and bar is RCr
9.56. 83 While it usually is difficult to discover why the Court has
promulgated, repealed or otherwise changed a rule, a series of
cases84 forming in effect a colloquy between the Kentucky and
United States Supreme Courts sheds some light on the Kentucky
Court's perhaps emotional basis for adopting RCr 9.56.
For a long time, Kentucky's criminal rules did not require a
presumption of innocence instruction, even if the defendant requested it, on the ground that a charge to the jury concerning
5
reasonable doubt obviated the necessity for such an instruction.8
Kentucky procedures generally avoided instructions concerning
any presumptions, adopting instead a "bare bones" approach.8
Kentucky's rules did, however, require an instruction on reasonable doubt, 87 defined, if at all, as "substantial doubt" or "real
doubt."s8
The United States Supreme Court's 1978 opinion in Taylor
v. Kentucky 9 raised serious questions concerning the validity of
Kentucky's "bare bones" approach and of the Kentucky courts'
typical definition of reasonable doubt5 In response to Taylor,
the Kentucky Supreme Court promptly amended RCr 9.56 to re-

8' See Plymale & McSwain, supra note 73, at 14. Although the Court held a public
hearing on the rules proposed by the Criminal Rules Revision Committee, see note 72 supra,
RCr 7.26 was deleted altogether from that Committee's proposals. Thus, the public was
allowed absolutely no opportunity to. comment or debate on RCr 7.26.
83 RCr 9.56. See note 91 infra for the pertinent section of this rule.
84 Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478
(1978); Whorton v. Commonwealth, 585 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1979); Whorton v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
85 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd, 436
U.S. 478 (1978).
8 See Whorton v. Commonwealth, 570 S.W.2d at 632; cf. Cox v. Cooper, 510
S.W.2d 530, 535 (Ky. 1974) (instructions ought to provide "only the bare bones").
87 See Linden v. Commonwealth, 79 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. 1935); Lester v. Commonwealth, 67 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1934).
88 See, e.g., Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ky. 1965).
89 436 U.S. at 478.
90 Id. at 488 ("The trial court's truncated discussion of reasonable doubt.., was
hardly a model of clarity ....
[Its] definition, though perhaps not in itself reversible error, often has been criticized as confusing.").
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quire a presumption of innocence instruction "[in every case" and
to prohibit any instruction that "attempts to define reasonable
doubt." 91 But in Whorton v. Commonwealth,92 handed down by
the Kentucky Supreme Court only a few weeks after the Court
amended RCr 9.56,'3 both the plurality and concurring opinions
exhibit the Kentucky justices' resentment of Taylor.9 4 However,
their rule change proved to be an overreaction to Taylor. In Kentucky v. Whorton,95 the United States Supreme Court held that
a presumption of innocence instruction is not constitutionally required in every case.96 Nevertheless, RCr 9.56, changed in reaction to Taylor, remains the same today.
The unaccountability and seeming unreasonableness in the
history of the new RCr 7.26 and 9.56 could be curbed if the
legislature is deemed to have concurrent authority over rulemaking. In Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts,97 however, the
Court clearly indicates that it will not recognize legislative enactments, even in a spirit of comity, when they concern matters expressly granted as within the Court's rulemaking power.

91 RCr 9.56. Subsection (1) of the rule provides in part: "In every case the jury shall
be instructed. . . [t]he law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime." Subsection
(2) goes on to provide: "instructions should not attempt to define the term 'reasonable
doubt.'" Id. at 9.56(2).
92 570 S.W.2d at 627.
93 RCr 9.56 became effective July 1, 1978, and the opinion in Whorton was issued
on July 25, 1978. See 570 S.W.2d at 627, 630 n.2.
94 The Court in fact took the opportunity to scold the United States Supreme Court
for the latter's decision in Taylor. See 570 S.W.2d at 631, 633-35. Justice Lukowsky, as
a result of Taylor, was apparently willing to give up trying to defend Kentucky's unique
criminal procedural rules. See 570 S.W.2d at 635 (Lukowsky, J., concurring). He suggested amending Kentucky's rules in more drastic ways, including: adopting the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure; "[p]ermitting the trial judge to charge the jury orally after
closing argument;" "[r]equiring the trial judge to fix all penalties other than death;" and
"[aldopting the Federal Rules of Evidence in toto." Id. (Lukowsky, J., concurring).
Many of the rule changes suggested above may not be within the Court's rulemaking power. Changes in rules of evidence might require legislative input. Cf. Rybeck v.
Rybeck, 358 A.2d 828, 843 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (the branch of government
that has responsibility to enact evidence rules is a "touchy subject in New Jersey;" the
rules of evidence finally adopted were the product of a cooperative effort between all the
branches). Even if such changes fall clearly within the Court's authority, they seem significant enough to warrant public hearings.
15 441 U.S. at 786.
96 Id. at 789.
97 609 S.W.2d at 682.
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COMMON SENSE REASONS FOR EXPANDING COMITY

The new Judicial Article grants express rulemaking powers to
the Supreme Court of Kentucky, but why should that express grant
be construed as exclusive of legislative action and outside the reach
of comity? As a matter of practical common sense, such a construction is undesirable. Treating the rulemaking authority granted
in the new Judicial Article as being held concurrently by the Court
and the legislature has the practical advantage of downplaying
constitutional confrontation with the legislature." The Court can
best avoid confrontation with the legislature by recognizing that
the most significant source of friction with the legislative branch
regarding the rulemaking power lies in the Court's attempt to draw
constitutional dividing lines over matters in which the public may
have a great deal of interest. 99
When the public becomes acutely aware of a matter concerning the judicial system, both the executive and the legislature will
want to influence the judicial rulemaking or administrative
process. 0 0 A judicial attitude of exclusivity that effectively
precludes any input from the other branches of government appears illegitimate and undemocratic.101 Rulemaking is generally
considered a legislative power0 2 which, when vested in the
highest court, is exercised by a body that not only makes the rules
but interprets them as well. 03 That same body also must deter98 Many commentators suggest a concurrent power approach. C. GRAU, supra note

59, at 15.
99 Court rules in Kentucky cover subjects from attorney advertising to bail procedure, many of which are of general public interest. Cf. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note
63, at 35 (courts serve an important public function and therefore the efficiency of their
administration is of general societal importance).
100 Cf. C. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 257-59 (1932)
(historical synposis of the early 1800s struggle in Kentucky concerning the nature of the
Kentucky judicial department-the legislature and governor were greatly involved in the
politics of the issue).
101 See C. GRAu, supra note 59, at 430-31. Cf. Parness & Manthey, supra note 62,
at 130 ("As a matter of political legitimacy, our democratic system requires that the public
have a voice in [judicial rulemaking] . . .").
102 j. Weinstein, supra note 63, at 408; Parness & Manthey, supra note 62, at 130.
103 Compare 81 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 423, at 2-939 (Dec. 21, 1981) ("it is difficult
to render an opinion on this question when the body which would ultimately decide the
constitutionality of KRS 30A.050(4) is the same body that has promulgated rules in conflict with the statute") with Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444
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mine the constitutional validity of the rules.04
This insistence on exclusivity in rulemaking has the potential

for a great deal of confrontation with the legislature. The Court
cannot appear neutral with regard to challenges made to its own
rules. It may, for example, have justices sitting on the bench who
participated in the formulation of the rule. °s Moreover, the
Court may be faced with a case challenging one of its rules as being outside its constitutional rulemaking authority.0 6 In such a
case, the Court decides not only the validity of a rule, but also
the limits of its own power. Thus, the Court's exercise of judicial
review in this kind of case can have the appearance of an arbitrary
01 7
exercise of judicial supremacy.

An attitude of judicial exclusivity also fosters public discontent with the courts that could result in unseemly or undesirable
political consequences. 01 The judiciary could, for example, be
denounced by the mediac1e or the political branches.11o Further-

(1946) ("fact that this Court promulgated the rules as formulated and recommended...
does not foreclose consideration of their validity...').
104Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (Court will refuse to apply its
rule in an Erie situation only if Congress, the Court and Advisory Committee erred in
their prima facie judgment that the rule does not transgress the Constitution).
105Cf. In re Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 539 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Tenn. 1976) (Supreme Court
of Tennessee overruled petitioner's motion for the recusal of the justice who helped promulgate the rule). It is interesting to note, however, that the justice who helped write
the rule took no part in the decision that announced the Court's adoption of the rule. See
In re Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 532 S.W.2d 224, 230 n.4 (Tenn. 1975).
106 See, e.g., State v. Leonardis, 375 A.2d 607, 613 (N.J. 1977) (pre-trial diversion
rule for criminal defendants upheld as valid exercise of constitutional rulemaking authority
despite its effect on legislative and executive functions); Laudenberger v. Port Auth., 436
A.2d at 153-55 (pre-judgment interest rule upheld even though it has collateral effect on
substantive rights).
107 Cf. C. GRAu, supra note 59, at 12 ("The combination of rulemaking and ruleapplying roles, can arguably deny due process because the deciding judges are 'interested'
in the outcome of the litigation").
108 See the reaction of one commentator, Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and
Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CoNN. L. Rav. 1 (1975), to the case of State v.
Clemente, 353 A.2d 723 (Conn. 1974), where the Connecticut Supreme Court asserted
an exclusive rulemaking power in the absence of express constitutional authority to do so.
109 See, e.g., The Supreme Disgrace:An Editorial Investigation of Pennsylvania's
Supreme Court, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 1978 (reprintedin C. GPAU, supra note
59, at 50). The editorialist concluded that the Supreme Court should "lift its veil of secrecy
and become accountable to the public." Id.
0
11
See Ky. Gen. Ass. Res., Dec. 29, 1823, 1823 Ky. Acts 488. The General Assembly
denounced two judicial decisions declaring a statute unconstitutional. "Resolved... That
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more, it is conceivable that the people might alter or even
withdraw constitutional rulemaking authority from the courts."'
That the high court should possess rulemaking power has long
been recognized in Kentucky." 2 However, the Court should not

ignore common sense and attempt to exercise rulemaking power
to the exclusion of political or popular input. The General

Assembly could provide the public a forum for its views and its
petitions for redress from undesirable court rules. If the legislature
was to act as a political check on judicial rulemaking, the rules
adopted by the Court would have a greater "aura of legitimacy."" 3 Moreover, the Court could then be "less hesitant in
14
giving wide and effective sweep to its own power.""

To deem that the General Assembly possessed concurrent
rulemaking authority would require the Court to redefine comi-

ty as something to be applied not only in those cases where there
is no express rulemaking authority, but rather in all cases of judicial

policy making and rulemaking. Conflicts between the Court's
policies or rules and those statutes passed by the General Assembly
pose a difficult problem. The following section suggests a manner of resolving such conflicts in a true spirit of comity.
IV.

A

SUGGESTED APPROACH TO APPLYING COMITY

"At very root, comity is courtesy. In jurisprudence, however,
comity is a kind of courtesy which, subject to exceptions, is administered byfixed rules of law and rises to the dignity of a legal
in the opinion of this Legislature, the decisions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in
the cases of Blair against Williams [4 (Litt.) Ky. Rep. 34 (1823)], and Lapsley against
Brashear [4 (Litt.) Ky. Rep. 46 (1823)], are erroneous; and the laws therein declared to
be unconstitutional, are, in the opinion of the present General Assembly, constitutional
and valid acts." Ky. Gen. Ass. Res., 1823 Ky. Acts 488, 514-15. See generally C. HAINES,
supra note 100, at 258-59.
111 A bill was introduced in the 1980 General Assembly by Rep. Robert Heleringer,
which, if it had passed and been ratified by voters, would have explicitly given the Kentucky General Assembly rulemaking power concurrent with that of the Supreme Court
over those same matters which KY. CONSr. § 116 presently grants to the Supreme Court
alone. H.B. 228, 1980 Ky. General Assembly. The bill may have been a legislative backlash
to the Kentucky judiciary's emerging claim of exclusive rulemaking power.
112 See REPORT OF THE EFFICIENCY COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY, THE GOVERNMENT OF
KENTUCKY 511-17 (1924).
113 j. WEINSTEIN, supra note 62, at 11.
11' Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 63, at 36.
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right, as over against mere politeness in social intercourse." 5 In
Ex parte Farley'n 6the Court seemed to recognize an unexpressed
connection between "comity" and the "impairment" or "interference" test developed in the earlier inherent power cases.
However, Auditor severed even that tenuous connection, leaving
7
no "fixed rule" by which to apply the principle in Kentucky."1
Instead of no rule or even the "interference/impairment" test,
the Court could adopt an interest-balancing approach to deciding
when to defer to the legislature in "a spirit of comity." When a
court rule conflicts with a statute, comity would dictate an analysis
of the underlying policiesnl8 of the rule or statute in relation to
the legitimate interests"19 of the enacting body to determine
whether, and under what circumstances, the rule or statute should
predominate. The policies to keep in mind throughout this analysis
should be furtherance of justice ' and accountability to the
public. 121
This approach can be demonstrated with an analysis of the
conflict between KRS section 21A.070(1) 22 and Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure 76.28(4)(a).1ss Under the court rule, the Court
"1

Hughes v. Winkleman, 147 S.W. 994, 997 (Mo. 1912) (emphasis added).

116 570 S.W.2d at 617.

117 See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra for a discussion of the Court's rejection of the interference/impairment test.
118 Looking at the underlying policies of law is certainly not a new idea in the area
of conflict resolution. Brainerd Currie first developed a governmental interest analysis
in the conflicts/choice-of-law problems in the late 1950s and early 1960s. See generally,
B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1963).
119 Examining the legitimate interest of a governmental exercise of power has been
used to resolve potential conflicts between laws. The United States Supreme Court has
tolerated state regulation of interstate commerce, for instance, so long as the state's attempt to legislate has concerned matters in which it has a legitimate interest and has not
unduly burdened interstate commerce. See South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell,
303 U.S. 177 (1938) (reasonable for state to legislate to protect roads built and maintained
by it despite the effect on interstate commerce since no illegitimate purpose, such as an
attempt to discriminate or to burden commerce, could be shown); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
120 This policy underlaid the early inherent judicial power cases. See the discussion
of these cases in the text accompanying notes 14-25 supra.
121 Commentators have amply demonstrated that this is an overriding consideration
in the judicial exercise of power. See generally, e.g., C. GRAu, supra note 59; J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 62; Parness & Manthey, supra note 62.
122 KRS § 21A.070(1) (Supp. 1982).
123 Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(a).
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publishes only those opinions which it so designates.' i 4 However,
the statute unequivocally says, "All opinions of the Supreme Court
shall be published." 125 Chief Justice Stevens has suggested that
the Court follow its own rule because the expense of reporting all
the Court's opinions far exceeds any benefit that could ever be
derived from publishing decisions that merely restate settled principles of law.'2
Policy choices between the cost and the desirability of publication are more appropriately matters of concern for the General
Assembly.12 The General Assembly has a legitimate interest in
seeing that the public be informed of what the Supreme Court
has said the law is. The statute is a rational means of achieving
that interest. The General Assembly in passing the statute has
counted the potential costs of publishing all opinions and decided
in favor of publication. Thus, the Court should accept the statute
as the norm for opinion publication and deviate from it only in
those instances where the ends of justice would be "materially
impaired."12
The facts of Commonwealth v. Schumacher'2 also illustrate
how this interest-balancing approach could work. In Schumacher,
the defendant argued that the Commonwealth's appeal of a lower
court's dismissal of his indictment must fail because the provisions
of KRS section 22A.020(4)(b) 130 had not been followed. 31 That
statute conditions the Commonwealth's right to appeal in criminal
cases on the Attorney General's approval after being fully "satisfied
that review by the Court of Appeals is important to the correct
and uniform administration of the law."' To carry out this purpose, the circuit court clerk is required to transmit the case record
124

Id.

125 KRS § 21A.070(1) (Supp. 1982).
12 Address by Chief Justice Robert Stephens to the staff of the Kentucky Office of
the Attorney General (Aug. 1982).

127 The power over matters affecting the public's welfare and concerning the public's
purse is universally deemed a legislative rather than a judicial concern. Cf. 16 AM. Jur.
2d ConstitutionalLaw § 318 (1979) (legislature has power to control, direct and shape
public policy for state).
128Cf. Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d at 946.
12 566 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
130KRS § 22A.020(4)(b) (1980).
131566 S.W.2d at 763.
132 KRS § 22A.020(4)(b) (1980).
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to the Attorney General.3 3 The court of appeals struck the
statute as unconstitutional because, it said, matters of appeal procedure fall within the Supreme Court's exclusive rulemaking

domain.1'3
The court of appeals' short analysis of the statute does not show
appropriate comity. The interest the legislature is trying to promote with the statute is a unified prosecutorial system headed by

the Attorney General. 13 This unified system is best achieved
when the Attorney General is informed of the criminal cases in
which the Commonwealth as a party is appealing, 136 and when
he or she has a say as to whether those appeals will be carried

out. 137

The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has an interest in seeing that court records are kept in the hands of court personnel

33

Id.

134 566 S.W.2d at 764. The court then addressed the merits of whether the trial court

erred in dismissing the indictment. Id. The court of appeals in Schumacher could have
avoided the constitutional rulemaking power issue and still reached the merits of the case
by narrowly construing the statute as being solely for the benefit of the state and its unified
prosecutorial system and not for the benefit of the defendant.
135 Cf. KRS § 15.700 (1980) (Attorney General, as the chief prosecutor of the Commonwealth, is to try to maintain "efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of justice").
Casting the issue in Schumacherin terms of the statute's placing a condition on
appellate procedure misses the point of the statute. A unified prosecutorial system requires
that someone be able to determine whether, and under what circumstances, the Commonwealth will take an appeal. The effect of the Schumacher case is to put the power
to make that determination in the hands of the commonwealth or county attorney. This,
of course, militates against the legislature's desire to have a unified prosecutorial system
as expressed in KRS § 15.700 (1980). If the legislature desires the commonwealth's attorneys
not to take criminal appeals except upon approval by the Attorney General, the Court
should not interfere with that determination.
136 The Attorney General, in the furtherance of his or her duty to oversee the unified
prosecutorial system, see id., needs to be informed of when the Commonwealth has taken
a criminal appeal. Even if it were deemed that the constitutional grant of rulemaking
power over appellate procedure to the Kentucky Supreme Court precluded this statute's
conditioning the Commonwealth's right to appeal upon the Attorney General's approval,
certainly the notice function of this statute-i.e., keeping the Attorney General informed
of criminal appeals taken on behalf of the Commonwealth-would not violate that constitutional grant. So to the extent this statute involves a notice function, the court of appeals should have refrained from striking it as void.
137 Obviously, the most effective way for the Attorney General to oversee the prosecutorial system is to help choose the cases which the Commonwealth should pursue on
appeal. See id.
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and not dispersed to other governmental bodies such as the Attorney General's Office.138 The Court, in addition, has a legitimate interest in protecting a private party or criminaldefendant
from having the right to appeal conditioned in any way by a statute.139 But an interest by the Court in preventing the state from
conditioning its own right to appeal in criminal cases seems totally lacking140 Thus, an interest-balancing approach to comity
would dictate upholding the statute because no real conflict exists
between the Supreme Court's interest in controlling access to court
records and the state's interest in having the Attorney General
review and approve appeals by the state.
Taking this analysis a step further to consider the overriding
policies of furthering administration of justice while accounting
to the public, the Court could have legitimately declared the statute
unconstitutional to the extent it requires circuit court clerks to
transmit records to the Office of the Attorney General. It could
do so if the Court thought that placing court records in the hands
of persons other than court personnel might jeopardize the administration of justice. However, even if the statute was declared
unconstitutional in this regard, the Court would need to accommodate the statute's function in giving notice to the Attorney
General. The Court could require circuit court clerks to give at
least some sort of notice to the Attorney General of criminal cases
in which the Commonwealth has appealed.
The foregoing examples show that it is important for the courts
to look behind statutes and rules to the underlying policies and
interests in order to accord proper comity when considering enactments by the General Assembly. Frequently, statutes and rules

138 Cf. Ex parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d at 624 (Court has inherent power to control
its own records).
139 This duty to protect private ligitants from having their right to appeal impaired
by a statute is derived from KY. CONST. § 115, which guarantees to any party, except the
Commonwealth in double jeopardy situations, the right to at least one appeal.
140 That the Commonwealth has a right to an appeal in criminal cases under certain narrow circumstances, see id., such as those in Schumacher, does not mean that the
General Assembly did not have the power to impose a duty upon the Attorney General
to determine whether an appeal should be taken. The legislature has traditionally been

deemed able to prescribe duties for the Attorney General. Commonwealth v. Southern
Pac. Co., 105 S.W. 466, 467 (Ky. 1907).
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can be read together without invalidating either. 141 If legitimate
underlying policies and interests are articulated, conflicts between
court rules and statutes can often be avoided; even if they cannot
be avoided, the Court can choose whether to follow the rule or
the statute, keeping in mind the overriding considerations of the
42
administration of justice and accountability to the public.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has indicated that it wants
to show comity toward the General Assembly. It has said it respects
43
the legislative department as a co-ordinate of government.'
However, it has staked out for itself an exclusive claim over judicial
rulemaking and administration such that no statute concerning
a matter that arguably falls within the Court's constitutionally
granted power can be allowed to stand.114 Comity has thus become a concept with no fixed rules145 of application. Rather, the
Court invokes comity as a way of saying that it will allow a statute
46
to remain on the books until it promulgates a contrary rule.
This Note has attempted to offer, in order to provide some
semblance of fixed rules with which to invoke comity, an interestanalysis approach appropriately adapted to resolving conflicts between statutes and court rules. Such an analysis requires looking
behind statutes and rules to the legitimate interests underlying them
to determine whether a conflict actually exists. If there is a conflict, this analysis suggests that two important policy considera-

141

See an example of this in the discussion of the Schumacher case in the text ac-

companying notes 129.-40 supra.
142 Cf. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTs LAw

§ 96 (1977) sets forth choice-influenc-

ing considerations for "true" conflict of laws situations).
143 See Ex parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d at 624.
144 See text'accompanying notes 33-50 supra.
145 See text accompanying notes 44-45 & 117 supra.
146 See Evans v. Commonwealth, No. 82-SC-194-DG, slip op. at 3 (Court will allow
statute concerning matter within judicial province to stand until it promulgates a rule
otherwise); O'Bryan v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d at 158 (same); Spanski v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 290, 291-92 (Ky. 1980) (Supreme Court will allow trial court
to convene grand jury absent express statutory authority to do so). But cf. Department
for Human Resources v. Paulson, 622 S.W.2d 508, 509 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (exclusive
rulemaldng authority of Supreme Court does not include the assessing of legal fees against
the Commonwealth when the amount is beyond legislatively established funds).
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tions-accountability and administration of justice-should influence the Court in choosing which of the rules or statutes to follow.
The analytical framework here suggested is necessarily limited
and complex. 147 But perhaps the Supreme Court of Kentucky will
at least be aware that a strict, exclusive separation of powers view
of rulemaking is inimical to a proper concept of comity and that
accountability to the public, in addition to the Court's traditional
concern with the administration of justice, must become an important consideration when the Court exercises its rulemaking
148
power.
Douglas L. McSwain

147 This Note, for example, does not discuss how to resolve conflicts between a Court

choice to .have no rule regarding a matter within its rulemaking power and a statute regarding that same matter. In this instance, the analysis might be analogous to that used
for finding negative implications of the commerce power contained in U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. at 770-71 (Supreme Court
of the United States applied a benefits versus burdens balancing test to determine whether
state regulation of matters affecting interstate commerce could stand).
148 Weinstein noted in his book that differences of opinion with regard to court
rulemaking procedures may exist, but that he hoped those who differed with him "would
speak out so that the matter c[ould] be thoroughly debated." J. WEINSTEIN, supra note
62, at 153. It is hoped that others will speak out on this important separation of powers
issue so that it can be "thoroughly debated" in the Commonwealth.

